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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in International Commercial Law, 
Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic University.  
 
The subject matter concerns the dimension of the phenomenon of cross-border 
double taxation, either economic or juridical, in the privileged field of the EU internal 
market. At first instance, recourse has been found in the Union’s fundamental freedom 
of establishment and free movement of capital, as provided for in the Treaty for the 
Functioning of the European Union. At the same time, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has a leading role in the interpretation of the fundamental freedoms 
in the scheme of specific cases brought before the Court in the form of preliminary 
questions. Moreover, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive provides for a piecemeal 
confrontation of cross-border double taxation, as presented between parent 
companies and subsidiaries, established in the territory of two Member States. The 
available instruments are not limited on EU level. Thus, it is for the OECD Model Law to 
be used as a basis on the formation and interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions 
for the delimitation of the Contracting States’ taxing powers. In the end, there was 
made an attempt to approach the Greek Tax System on the taxation of dividends and 
its reformation in accordance to the EU legal order. 
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thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Finally, I 
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Introduction 
Participation in the capital of a company may be very profitable both for individuals, 
who want to make an efficient investment, and for legal persons who seek to optimize 
their commercial relations by establishing a business chain in the domestic or the 
internal market of the EU and with third counties. In the scheme of the optimization of 
the European market and the provision of incentives for the enhancement of economic 
relations in the territory of the Member States the quiver of the Union’s primary 
legislation attributes to, EU nationals, even natural or legal persons, fundamental 
freedoms for the abolition of inequalities in treatment of nationals between the 
Member States, as long as the secondary legislation remains amputated. 
In this framework there is an open discussion in progress, as regards the allocation of 
taxing powers between the Member States involved. The avoidance of double taxation 
of dividends in the hands of the company and the shareholder, at national level or 
(mostly) in cross-border situations, is at stake to the extent that the harmonization 
process in the field of direct taxation has generated only fragmented rules. In an 
attempt to represent the multifaceted problems caused by discrepancies in the tax 
systems of the Member States, it is important, first, to approach the well-established 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, CJEU), and then 
proceed with the analysis of the mere part of the issues dealt through the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive and a review on the adaptation of the Greek tax system. 
Last but not least, this puzzle of rules will be filled by reference to the contribution of 
the Double Taxation Convention in connection with the relating provisions of the OECD 
Model Convention, so as to complete the international image of the subject matter. 
The in-depth comprehension of the subject requires structured approach of the 
relevant fundamental freedoms in the primary EU law through CJEU case law, covering 
the first chapter of the foregoing thesis, emphasis added to the cross-border situations 
of double taxation on dividends. 
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1. Types of double taxation 
The tax system that each Member State applies and the width of its scope may result in 
the phenomenon of double taxation. The definition of resident and the determination 
of income's source based on divergent principles and national rules impedes the 
simplification of the tax regimes and overlooks the need for legal certainty. 
In practice we recognize two distinctive forms of double taxation, i.e. economic and 
juridical double taxation1; Situations where two different taxpayers (natural or legal 
persons) are in the same period taxed on the same economic transaction, income or 
capital, as it usually happens in the hands of a company and its shareholders as 
dividends, by one or more States, are typically included in the term of economic double 
taxation.  
On the other side, when the same taxpayer is taxed twice on the same income or other 
taxable item by more than one States, the type of juridical double taxation emerges. In 
the absence of uniform tax regimes, concerning the connecting factor used by the 
States to define the taxable persons and their taxable income, the application, for 
example, of the principle of residence enabling the taxation of a taxpayers worldwide 
income, as usually observed, is at odds with taxation of income generated by the State 
in the territory of which it is generated. Nevertheless, the elimination of juridical 
double taxation is a matter of allocation of taxing powers, effectively attempted by 
means of bilateral tax conventions.  
2. Economic double taxation in the primary EU law and the CJEU case law 
2.1. EU law interference in the field of direct taxation 
Within the Union's internal market, the situation gets complicated when a Member 
State applies different rules in comparable domestic and cross-border situations. In this 
framework, notwithstanding that the infringement of the principle of non-
discrimination underscores the necessity of a unified set of substantive rules of direct 
taxation against economic double taxation, this aim has not been achieved on EU level. 
                                                 
1
Vogel/Rustin Vogel, K., Reimer, E., Rust, A., & Becker, J. (2015), Klaus Vogel on double taxation 
conventions, Den Haag: Wolters Kluwer, Law & Business, p. 12 et seq. 
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The condition of unanimous act in Article 115 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter, TFEU), in the scope of which harmonization of direct 
taxation rules is set, averts the approximation of the domestic legal orders of the 
Member States, in contrast to the ordinary legislative procedure followed for the 
harmonization of indirect taxation systems. Indeed, the only sample of cooperation 
between the Member States regarding taxation of dividends is the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, narrowly construed to cover a mere part of the problem. 
Besides these initiatives, EU law does not contain any direct prohibition regarding 
juridical double taxation, as it would otherwise interfere in the fiscal sovereignty of 
each Member State to define the criteria for allocation of its taxing power. Thereon, 
the CJEU has lucidly framed the limited margins of intervention in juridical double 
taxation cases by means of primary EU law provisions, contending that this 
phenomenon results from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal 
sovereignty in areas that no EU secondary law-sourced criteria of competence 
attribution exist2. Likewise Kerckhaert and Morres case, the Court supported in 
Damseaux case, that to the extent that compliance with Community law sought is 
affirmed in each respective case “disadvantages which could arise from the parallel 
exercise of tax competences by different Member States, to the extent that such an 
exercise is not discriminatory, do not constitute restrictions prohibited by the EC [now 
TFEU] Treaty”3. 
2.2 Interpretation of freedom of establishment and movement of capital in double 
taxation cases 
The interpretative competency of the CJEU has been the taxpayers' only recourse 
because of the State's insufficient self-regulation against misconducts of national 
legislation on dividend taxation. The leading principle in the assessment of the factual 
background of each case is the principle of non-discrimination, read as treating in the 
same way dividend income from companies established in the Member State in which 
the taxpayer concerned is resident and dividends income from companies established 
                                                 
2
Judgment of 14 November 2006, Kerckhaert and Morres, C-513/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:713, paragraphs 
20-22;  
3
Judgment of 16 July 2009,Damseaux, C-128/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:471, paragraph 27 
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in another Member State. This principle been embodied and evolved, particularly, in 
connection to the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the free movement 
of capital (Article 63 TFEU), it is being invoked in the majority of double taxation cases 
that do not fall in the scope of special provisions. 
Subsequently, the reasonable question about the freedom applied in each case could 
be also answered by reference to several CJEU cases. It has been, indeed, observed 
that the CJEU usually applies both the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital. Their correlation has been sorted out by reference to the 
purpose of the legislation at issue4. This position has been multiple times clarified as 
enabling the invocation of both freedoms, on the one hand, the freedom of 
establishment where the national provision captures shareholdings with a definite 
influence on the company, and, on the other hand, free movement of capital when the 
shareholding is acquired with the intention to make a financial investment5. 
2.3. Taxation of intercompany dividends in the light of the CJEU case-law 
 
2.3.1 Inbound dividends 
 
Given that CJEU's case law may be the most efficient instrument for the orientation 
within the plethora of rulings on double taxation of dividends, the distinction between 
cases concerning inbound dividends, i.e. dividend flowing into the State of residence of 
the shareholder, and outbound dividends, i.e. distribution of dividends viewed by the 
side of the distributing company, would facilitate the categorization and understanding 
of the disputes addressed to the CJEU in the form of preliminary rulings by the national 
courts. Hence, in the epicenter of the hereby attempted systematic presentation of the 
Court's approach of the subject matter one will find some principal cases.  
The mapping of the unknown water of double taxation of inbound dividends actually 
began with Verkooijen case6, ground on the principle of non-discrimination of 
nationally-sourced against foreign-sourced dividends. Specifically, in the light of free 
                                                 
4
Judgement of 10 February 2011, Österreichische Salinen, Joint cases C-436/08 and C-437/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:17, pp. 33 and 34;    
5
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 19 January 2017, C-6/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:34, 
paragraph 39; Judgement of 13 March 2014, Bouanich, C-375/12, ECLI: EU:C:2014:138, paragraph 28. 
6
Judgement of 6 June 2000, Verkooijen, C-35/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:294 
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movement of capital, the Court contended that making the grant of exemption of 
dividends from national income tax conditional upon the State of the company seat, 
therefore, ascribing the right of exemption only to dividends paid to residents by 
companies resident in the same Member State, works as a disincentive for nationals of 
this Member State who aim to invest their capital in companies resident in other 
Member States and, conversely, for foreign companies to raise capital in the first 
Member State7. Such a restriction of free movement of capital had also occupied the 
Court in Manninen8 case, in which the Finnish income tax legislation did not provide for 
a tax credit in respect of dividends received by persons fully taxable in Finland by a 
company established in Sweden. What is to be elicited and it will be further analyzed 
hereunder in both cases is that the Court turned down justification arguments on 
objectively incomparable situation of taxpayers receiving dividends from companies 
established in the Member State and those having invested their capital abroad, under 
Article 65(1)(a), and on overriding reasons in the public interest, such as the cohesion 
of tax system9. Finally, in the upshot of both cases, the Court underlined that although 
direct taxation falls within the exclusive competence of the Member State, in the 
exercise of this power they should respect the EU law, confirming the supremacy of EU 
primary law over the domestic legislation, and ruled for the equation of the 
shareholders receiving domestic-sourced dividends to those receiving foreign-sourced 
ones, since they suffer the same burden of economic double taxation10.  
Between numerous cases, it would be interesting to make a review on two cases on 
the double taxation of inbound intercompany dividends. In Accor11case, it has to be 
mentioned that this case constitutes a characteristic example on the combined 
application of the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment, justified 
by the width of the tax provision at issue applying both to shareholders exercising a 
decisive influence in the subsidiary and shareholders of minor holdings12. In the factual 
background of the case, the French General Tax Code included a discriminatory 
                                                 
7
Ibid., pp. 34, 35 
8
Judgment of 7 September 2004, Manninen, C-319/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:484 
9
 Ibid, pp. 32 to 35 
10
Watter, P., Taxation of Intercompany Dividends and EU law: Three Surprising Aspects of the Recent 
Case Law of the European Court”, in Maisto, G. (2012), Taxation of intercompany dividends under tax 
treaties and EU law, Amsterdam: IBFD, p.42 
11 Judgment of 15 September 2011, Accor SA, C-310/09 
12
 Ibid, pp. 34 to 38 
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provision depriving parent companies receiving foreign-sourced dividends and 
redistributing them to their shareholders of right to set off the advance payment 
against the tax credit applied to the distribution of those dividends, as if they were 
distributed by a resident subsidiary. Besides the obvious infringement of the 
aforementioned freedoms, the third preliminary question introduces a procedural 
issue; the condition of evidence with respect to the distributed dividends, such as the 
amount of tax on profits actually paid in the Member State of the subsidiary, is 
therefore examined according to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Based 
on the right of the Member State of the parent company to require proof concerning 
the conditions for the ascription of the tax advantage, it is necessary for this Member 
State to know to the exact height of the tax paid in the Member State of the 
subsidiary13. Thus, the sole declaration of the imposition of corporation tax is not 
sufficient and the respective obligation cannot be overridden with recourse to the 
mechanism of mutual assistance of the competent authorities of the Member States, 
given that a possible difficulty of the parent company to provide requested information 
“is due not to the inherent complexity of the information but to a possible lack of 
cooperation on the part of the subsidiary that has [the] information”, which “enable 
the tax authorities of the Member State of taxation to ascertain, clearly and precisely 
whether the conditions for obtaining a tax advantage are met”14,  but only if it is not 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult to be proven.  
 
In Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation15, the Court was brought before two 
different systems for the mitigation of economic double taxation. On the one hand, 
shareholders receiving domestic-sourced dividends were exempt from corporation tax, 
while, on the other hand, shareholders receiving foreign-sourced dividends could 
offset the amount of withholding tax paid by the subsidiary against their corporation 
tax liability. The tax system applied was more aggravating for the latter shareholders 
by the time of a further distribution of dividends to their shareholders, as no relief of 
                                                 
13
 Ibid, pp.88 to 90 
14
 Ibid, p. 96 to 98; see also Judgment of 30 June 2011, Meilicke, C-262/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:438, pp. 41 
to 46 
15
Judgment of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation, C-
446/04,ECLI:EU:C:2006:774 
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the advance corporation tax imposed by the national law to such distributions was 
allowed. To the preliminary question regarding the compatibility with the EU law of 
this two-tier tax system, the Court held that in the Member States may in their own 
discretion choose within different systems in the elimination of double taxation, 
though always in compliance to EU freedoms. The equivalence between them is not 
always given, but only if the tax rate on foreign-sourced dividends is not higher than 
the rate on domestic-sourced dividends and the tax credit is at least equal to the 
amount paid by the subsidiary, up to the limit of the tax charged in the Member State 
of the shareholder, the ascertainment of the specific been left to the national court of 
the state of the shareholder16.Moreover, as regards the burden of proof, additional 
administrative burden inevitably following the tax credit system does not 
automatically result to discrimination against shareholders of foreign-sourced 
dividends, but only if the national court considers them to be excessive17. 
 
2.3.2 Outbound dividends 
 
From the point of view of the Member State of the distributing subsidiary, the 
challenge of non-discrimination remains, whereas the components of the fiscal 
systems involved change. Instead tackling double taxation caused through the 
imposition of tax burden in the company level (corporation tax) as well as in the hands 
of the shareholder (income tax in the Member State of the parent company) in 
inbound situations, outbound dividends should be dismissed of the double burden of 
the corporation tax in addition to a withholding tax in the Member State of the 
subsidiary levied the time of the cross-border distribution.  
 
In practice, the Court managed to dissolute this conjunction, as described in two cases. 
First in Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation case18, in the national 
legislative background, resident shareholders receiving domestic-sourced dividends 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, pp.56 and 57. 
17
Judgment of 10 February 2011, Haribo and Osterreichsche Salinen, C-436/08 and 437/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:61, pp. 95,96 
18
Judgment of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, C-374/04, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:773 
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was taking advantage of a partial imputation of the corporate tax paid in advance of a 
dividends distribution, against their tax obligation19. In effect, resident shareholders 
were only taxed only to the extent that their income exceeded the amount of tax 
credit that they were entitled20. On the other hand, non-resident shareholders were 
entitled to tax credit in case of such a distribution only if so provided by a double tax 
convention between the two States. According to the Court, the difference in 
treatment is to be found, not in the process of distribution of dividends by a resident 
subsidiary, but in the capacity of a further distribution by only the resident 
shareholders under the entitlement of a tax credit21. In this case, the Member State of 
the subsidiary distributing dividends to resident shareholders is not in the same 
position to the Member State of residence of a subsidiary distributing abroad, as the 
latter is only the source of the dividends.  In these circumstances, that the position of 
resident and non-resident shareholders could be considered comparable if the 
Member State of the subsidiary indiscriminately imposes a tax burden on receiving 
resident and non-resident shareholders for dividends received as income arising in its 
territory, though not made in it22, this Member State should make both shareholders 
subject to the same treatment. 
 
In Denkavit International and Denkavit France case23, in the assessment of the French 
tax legislation regarding the imposition of a withholding tax on dividends paid to a non-
resident parent company, whilst exempting distributions between resident companies, 
the CJEU faced a discreet treatment based on the place of the company seat. The 
special feature to be noted is that the Court took into consideration the applicability of 
the Franco-Netherlands Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation allowing 
offsetting the withholding tax applied by the Convention, as part of the legal 
framework of the case and under the light of its compatibility with the freedom of 
establishment. From this point of view, the Court held that even this measure does not 
counterpoise the difference in treatment between resident and non-resident parent 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, p.5 
20
 Ibid, p.13 
21
 Ibid, pp. 61 to 63 
22
Ibid, p.68 to 70 
23
Judgment of 14.12.2006, Denkavit, C-170/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:783 
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companies, to the extent that the first benefit from a full exemption of their tax 
obligation24.  
 
2.4. Double taxation of Dividends in the Secondary EU law/ The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive 
 
Beside the armory of the Union's secondary legislation, partial harmonization of the 
Member States’ national legislative background on taxation of dividends was realized 
by virtue of the Parent Subsidiary Directive. The need for a common regime on taxation 
in case of parent companies and their subsidiaries established in different Member 
States was first handled by Directive 90/435/EC (hereinafter, the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive). After its first introduction, it went through several modernizing 
amendments, i.e. Directives 2003/123/EC, 2011/96/EU (recast of the Directive 
including all the previous amendments), 2013/13/EU and 2015/121/EU, in order to 
adapt to the radically changing economic environment of the internal market. 
Notable effort was paid to the composition of a simple and widely acceptable 
legislative instrument consisting of rules on the allocation of taxing powers and 
proposed techniques on the abolition of the phenomenon of double taxation of 
intercompany dividends, under specific preconditions. Nevertheless, this initiative also 
served the standardization of the Member States’ conflicting fiscal interests expressed 
by means of competition on taxation and sterile public interest, resident companies 
and their non-resident affiliated companies were in disadvantageous position 
compared to companies resident in the same Member State. 
2.4.1. Basic remarks on the Directive and its basic provisions  
 
The preamble of the Directive is enlightening as regards measures available to the 
Member State of the parent company regarding avoidance of double taxation. Thus, it 
provided for two options, either exemption of the profits from corporation tax 
(exemption method) or credit of the corporation tax paid by the subsidiary in the Host 
                                                 
24
Ibid, pp. 53 to 56 
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State from the parent company’s tax liability in the Home State (credit method). 
Additionally, the Directive anticipated for the abolition of the distributed profits from 
withholding tax coupled with the general rule for the taxation of the dividends only in 
the hands of the subsidiary and within its State of residence. 
Moving forward to the provisions of the Directive, our attention shall be focused on the 
main conditions for the application of the provisions and mainly on definition of some 
basic notions, as they shall be approached in the light of the Directive in its latest 
version 2011/96/EU after the latest amendments of 2015/121/EU (autonomous 
interpretation) and through the interpretative work of the CJEU. 
2.4.2. The status of a “company of a Member State” 
The second article has been a fertile field of analysis and reformation of the Directive's 
subjective scope. The definition of the word “company” has been crucial for the 
determination of the Directive’s scope. 
At first place, a “company of a Member State” shall: “(a) take(s) one of the forms listed 
in the Annex I, Part A;”. The draftsmen applied a list-based approach by reference to an 
exhaustive number of corporate forms as known in each Member State, next to a 
residual entity clause for some of them which captures any company incorporated 
under their national law and subject to corporate tax therein25. The wording of the list 
of corporate forms contained in the first version of the Directive was confined, as it 
captured only companies with legal personality and shared capital, with only few 
exceptions, thereafter, complemented with corporate forms subject to corporate tax in 
the territory of a Member State but considered as transparent by others. The extension 
of the list was necessary in order for the Directive to be updated and adapted to the 
business reality of the internal market and to the insertion of the European Company 
and the European Cooperative Society, as certain corporate forms were not listed even 
though they were carrying all the necessary characteristics. 
Aligned to the condition of incorporation, the company shall also be tax resident 
according to the law of the Member State of residence. The provision is quite 
                                                 
25
Tenore at Lang, M., Pistone, P., Schuch, J. & Staringer, C. (2016), Introduction to European tax law on 
direct taxation (4th edition). Wien: Linde, page 135 
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restrictive as it demands a very attentive research even of the provisions of a double 
taxation agreement so as to ensure that the company is not considered to be tax 
resident of a third State. For the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to apply, Article 4 (3) of the 
OECD Model Convention shall drive to the conclusion that the company considered 
domestic resident of two Contracting States (a Member State and a third State) has its 
place of effective management in the Member State (tie-breaker rule). 
The third condition follows the methodology of the first one, naming an exhaustive list 
of national corporate taxes to which a tax resident company shall be subject, without 
the possibility to be exempted. What is to be noted is that the clause of substitution of 
taxes is interpreted as to enclose only newly introduced taxes, fully replacing the 
former, being consistent with the prohibition of any option for the tax payer to 
manipulate the application of the Directive. 
The wording of Article 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive dictates the cumulative 
application of these three prerequisites. Therefore, a company missing one of these 
requirements may not benefit from the beneficial abolition of withholding tax in the 
state of the distributing subsidiary. This view is being confirmed in Aberdeen case, 
where the Court faces a Luxembourgish open-ended investment subsidiary company 
distributing dividends to a Finnish company. Given that the first met neither the 
condition of paragraph (a) nor paragraph (c) of Art. 2, the Court did not accept the 
extension of its subjective scope to a non-listed company, albeit a similar form was 
known in Finland. Hence, it mentioned that the prohibition of Article 5 of the Directive 
is reserved only for distribution of dividends within its scope; otherwise, it is for the 
Member States to take the necessary measures for the abolition of double taxation of 
dividends, unilaterally or by conventions26. 
Taking into consideration the configuration of these prerequisites in time and what is 
going to be mentioned for the following provisions, the amendments of the respective 
Annexes and lists were necessary for the adjustment of the EU legislation to the 
characteristics of the internal market at the specific time, addressing its protective 
                                                 
26
Judgment of 18 June 2009, Aberdeen, C-303/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:377, paragraphs 26-29  
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scope to a wider range of cases that were wrongfully left outside and making it more 
flexible. 
2.4.3. The parent-subsidiary relation 
 
For the attribution of the status of a parent (and its subsidiary) company, Article 3 
(1)(a) poses two alternative criteria, in combination to the prerequisites set at Article 2 
and the derogation options of the following paragraph. It adopts the participation 
criterion according to which the parent company shall hold at least 10% of the shared 
capital of its subsidiary company seated in another Member State, or at least 10% of 
the shared capital of a domestic company whose capital is held wholly or partially by a 
permanent establishment of the parent company in another Member State, so as to 
assimilate the new circumstances from the widespread use of permanent 
establishments. The percentage has been diminished from 25% to 10% in order to 
extent the benefits of the Directive to a broader basis27, although the type of the 
holding was not clarified by the provision. On the occasion of a dispute between a 
Belgian company and the Belgian Public Finance Authority, the Court had to rule on the 
application of Article 3(1) on usufructuary right over shares. Thus, in the Les Verges du 
Vieux Tauve case28, the comparison between the status of the owner of shares and the 
status of a holder of a right of usufruct on shares generated the reasoning that the 
legal relationship indicating the role of the parent company and its subsidiary does not 
stand for any subsequent transfer of this legal relationship from the parent company to 
a third party in the form of a usufruct. This interpretation stems also from Article 4(1) 
which demands distribution “by virtue of its association with its subsidiary”, but not 
because of usufructuary right. However, for the Court not to cut out the practical 
dimension of the question referred, it ended up to the conclusion that in so far as a 
Member State treats in the same way a resident company receiving domestic-sourced 
dividends as full owner of shares and a resident company receiving domestic-sourced 
dividends as holder of usufruct rights on shares, it shall extent this conduct as regards 
                                                 
27
Article 3 of the amending Directive 2003/123/EC 
28
Judgment of 22 December 2008, Les Verges du Vieux Tauves, C-48/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:758 
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receiving of foreign-sourced dividends by both, in order to be consistent with the 
freedom of establishment, even in situation out of the scope of the Directive29. 
In addition, the Member States have the option to adopt other criteria, such as holding 
of voting rights [Art. 3(2)(a)] through a bilateral agreement, or additionally require a 
holding period up to two years, which the Member States may abbreviate, but not 
prolong30, so as to capture wholly artificial constructions in accordance to the anti-
abuse clause of Article 1(2) of the Directive31. In the settled case-law, the Denkavit 
International and Others case32 is a typical example of this practice; the Court sought to 
interpret whether or not, according to the meaning of Art. 3 (2)(b), the parent 
company shall have already complied with the holding period of at least 2 years before 
enabling the benefit of Art. 5. First, it is to be noted that by this derogation the 
Member States aim to counteract short-term holdings effectuated “for the sole 
purpose to benefit from the tax advantages available”, in the spirit of Article 1 (2) as a 
provision of principle. Hence, the Court took into consideration three factors: the 
elimination of tax disadvantages of cross-border cooperation as stated in Recital 3 of 
the Directive, the wording of the provision of Art. 3(2)(a) and the use of the word 
“maintain”, which does not show any tendency towards the first interpretation option, 
and the purpose of the Directive of the establishment of a common tax system for the 
abolition of double taxation. Taken these as given, the Court decided that there is no 
legal basis for the strict interpretation of the provision as demanding the prior 
completion of the holding period, albeit it clarified that the Member States are free to 
determine legal arrangements for ensuring that this requirement may be observed by 
the parent company, as the provision remains silent. 
2.4.4. Permanent establishments 
 
To avoid ambiguities in the wording of the first version of the Directive, distributions 
made or received by permanent establishments are now regulated by Article 1(c) and 
(d) of it, recognizing this form of establishment as a common vehicle of doing 
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business33. In this framework, the purpose was for the permanent establishment to be 
perceived as equal factor in the equation of this pattern to a common parent-
subsidiary situation for the implementation of measures against economic double 
taxation. In this direction, Article 2 of the amending Directive 2003/123/EC added in 
the subjective scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive two types of permanent 
establishments: in triangular situations and bilateral situations; in the first, the 
Member State of the subsidiary shall exempt from withholding tax dividends 
distributed to the permanent establishment (Article 5 of the Directive), the Member 
State of the parent company and the Member State of the permanent establishment 
shall avoid economic double taxation of the dividends, according to Article 4 (1) of the 
Directive34. In the configuration of this regime, under which permanent establishments 
shall be treated as they were parent companies, the contribution of CJEU case-law was 
notable. Indeed, in Saint-Gobain case, the Court held that in the sense of the freedom 
of establishment, the Host Member State of a permanent establishment of a non-
resident company shall respect the right of a company established in a Member State 
to pursue its activities in another Member State under the same circumstances 
reserved for a national of that State. Accordingly, the Host Member State shall grant to 
it tax concessions dedicated to resident companies for the elimination of economic 
double taxation35. 
Bilateral situations of Article 1(1)(d) of the Directive, in which both the parent company 
and its subsidiary are seated in the same Member States and the permanent 
establishment is located in another Member States, also fall into the scope of the 
Directive and the elimination of economic double taxation as the distributed profits 
transcend the first Member State and are taxed in the second one. 
 
2.4.5. Distribution of profits 
 
The notions used in the body of the Directive shall be interpreted autonomously by 
reference to the scope and under the light of the Directive, for the sake of diverging 
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domestic legal systems harmonization, which give different meaning to these terms 
under their domestic tax law. Nevertheless, the Directive either refers explicitly to the 
domestic legal system of each Member State, when necessary, in order to define its 
subjective scope (e.g. company forms list, tax list), for issues that there is no 
homogeneity, or it indirectly arises that the burden shifts to the domestic legal order 
which determines, for example, what constitutes a deductible payment or what shall 
be considered as income. 
The term “distribution of profits” prevailed over the term “dividends” as the first is 
perceived broader than the latter. In order to avoid any interference of the domestic 
law, given that a safe and common definition cannot be extracted thereof, the Directive 
adopts the expression “distribution of profits” or “distributed profits”. In the concept of 
the autonomous interpretation of the terms it contains, the Directive applies to any 
distribution of profits from a subsidiary company, resident to a Member State, to its 
parent company, in another Member State, and conversely, or from subsidiaries to 
permanent establishments of their parent company, and conversely36. 
In practice, the Court ruled as regards special types of transfers between parent and 
subsidiaries; as mentioned above under 3.1.2., the Court, on the one hand, discarded 
arguments as regards the application of the Directive in distributions to holders of 
usufructuary rights on shares37, invoking the civil law bond between the parent 
company and its subsidiary.  On the other hand, it is firmly supported in the legal order 
of many Member States that these rules are also applied after re-characterization of 
interest payment, because of thin capitalization, or after price adjustment in transfer 
pricing cases. This conception as regards the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 
although it departs from what the Court ruled at the Les Verges du Vieux Tauves case, 
is consistent with the main goal of the Directive, for the elimination of double taxation, 
and in the view of the addressing of anti-abuse rules.    
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2.5. Measures against economic double taxation 
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive provides for two measures counter economic and 
judicial double taxation, for the Member States of the parent company and the 
subsidiary, respectively; article 4 describes the exemption and credit methods, while 
Articles 5, 6 and 7 rule for the abolition of withholding tax, read in conjunction with 
Article 1 (1). 
2.5.1. In the Member State of the parent  
 
The Member State of the parent company and the Member States of its permanent 
establishment are obliged to choose between the exemption of the inbound dividends 
from domestic taxes and a credit mechanism for the parent company to deduct the 
amount paid by its subsidiary and any low-tier subsidiary from its tax obligation up to 
the amount of its due. Additionally, Article 6 dictates the Member State of the parent 
company to abstain from imposition of withholding tax on inbound dividends. The 
possibility of double non-taxation38 was treated under the amending Directive 
2014/86/EU added a clause in Article 4 according to which the Member State of the 
parent company shall tax such profits, to the extent that they are deductible, or refrain 
from taxing if they are not deductible. However, application of both methods is in some 
cases acceptable in the scheme of the Directive, as the Home State shall apply its 
domestic rules or the provisions of a double tax convention, according to Article 7 of 
the Directive. 
The importance of the basic provision of Article 4 is confirmed through the settled 
case-law; in Cobelfert case39, the Court was, inter alia, in favor of the provision's direct 
effect in the framework of a dispute between the Belgian State and Cobelfert, a 
Belgium established company. In the background of the referred preliminary question, 
the Belgian legislation had opted for a tax exemption method according to which a 
resident parent company could exempt up to 95% of its received dividends, after 
including it these profits to its basis of assessment and under the condition that after 
the exemption of other deductible profits, profits remain. The Court underlined that 
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Art. 4 (1) does not impose such a condition, therefore the Belgian provision constitutes 
a unilaterally introduced restrictive measure, even though the relevant provision 
reduces and carries forward the losses up to the amount of the dividends not 
exempted. Additionally, the Court rejected the arguments of the Belgian Government 
supporting that the provision of Article 4 is sufficiently precise and unconditional, thus 
having direct effect and it can be, therefore, raised before national courts. 
2.5.2. In the Member State of the subsidiary 
 
For the Member State of the subsidiary, Article 5 introduces the abolition of 
withholding tax on the distributed profits, while the corresponding provision for the 
Member State of the parent company gives it the discretion to exempt the profits of 
the withholding tax, so as to avoid double taxation in its territory. 
The term “withholding tax” has been interpreted by the CJEU in the light of the 
Directive's objective as an autonomous notion, regardless economic burden under the 
same title found in the national legal systems40. In Athinaiki Zithopiia case41, the CJEU 
provided for a comprehensive overview of the term’s characteristics as perceived in 
practice and in the framework of Article 5 (1) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 
irrespective of the classification under national law42. First, the Court described it as a 
mechanism according to which, in cross-border situations, the subsidiary withholds 
part of the dividends before their distribution to the parent company in another 
Member State, and it attributes it to the tax authorities, resulting in (juridical) double-
taxation where dividends are distributed to foreign shareholders. In the factual 
background of the dispute, the Greek Income Tax Code for the determination of the 
company’s taxable profits added to its net profits income subject to special taxation 
and non-taxable income, in contrast to what was happening when no distribution had 
taken place. As regards the nature of the imposed burden, the Court stated that it is 
should not be examined as connected to certain types of national taxation, but be 
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rather interpreted autonomously. Thus, it used two criteria43, i.e. the fact that the 
chargeable event for the difference in the tax treatment was the distribution as fact 
and its size, resulting in the rupture of the principle for the abolition of withholding tax. 
The Court had earlier, in Epson Europe case44, reproached national imposed burden 
equivalent to withholding tax levied by the shareholder, on the occasion of the 
distribution of dividends, attributed by way of withholding it. 
                                                 
43
Lazaretou Theodora, Taxation of profits distributed from the subsidiary to the parent company, ΔΦΝ 
2006, volume 60, p. 651 et seq; Georgios Matsos, Observation on Athinaiki Zithopoiia case, ΕΕΕυρΔ 
4/2001, p. 88 
44
Judgment of 8 June 2000, Epson Europe BV, C-375/98,ECLI:EU:C:2000:302 
  -19- 
3. Measures on the avoidance of double taxation in the OECD Model 
Convention 
3.1. Operation of the OECD Model Convention 
Impulsed by the need to settle issues on the avoidance of the international double 
taxation, the States built bilateral communication channels between them. In this 
scheme, the sign of a Double Tax Convention serves the self-restriction of the tax 
power of two sovereign States in areas of overlapping jurisdiction (negative effect)45. 
Facing the problem of economic and juridical double taxation, the prior definition of 
the conditions under which under which a cross-border economic transaction (herein, 
a distribution of dividends) would be taxable according to the law of one of the 
Contracting States is deemed indispensable component of the legal certainty for those 
who want to reassure a profitable investment way. 
Their binding effect is a result of their legal nature; they are bilateral conventions 
containing binding clauses as the outcome of negotiations and the Parties’ mutual 
acceptance. In the hierarchy of the statutory instruments, Double Tax Conventions are 
international law and they have the power that the national legal order recognizes. In 
the absence of any harmonizing rules, the States have the power to regulate their fiscal 
policy as they wish, unilaterally or stipulating a Double Tax Convention, which prevails 
over any relevant national provision, when following the doctrine “lex specialis 
derogate legi generali”. 
As regards the relevance of a Double Tax Convention to the Parent- Subsidiary 
Directive, Article 7(2) of the Directive contains an exception of EU law's supremacy 
over all the other sources of law, in cases that the relevant national or agreement-
based provision rules against double taxation of dividends. For the interpretation of the 
provision, in Océ van der Grinten case46, the ECJ stated that the imposition of a 
withholding tax on dividends in the state of the distributing company derogates from 
the general principle of Art. 5, therefore, the provision of Article 7 (2) shall be 
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interpreted restrictively, authorizing measures directed only to eliminating or lessening 
of double taxation47. 
3.2. Article 10 of the OECD Model Convention 
The OECD Model Convention was offered as a base for drafting and interpreting Double 
Tax Conventions on the coordination of the tax systems on international scale, as 
extensively as possible, based on provisions indicatively appropriate to compromise 
conflicting and superposing taxing interests between the Source State and the State of 
residence of the receiving party. Notwithstanding the right of the Contracting States to 
depart from its provisions, the directions addressed to them are clear. The Contracting 
States are oriented towards Residence State taking precedence over Source Sate on 
dividends taxation, although not prohibiting the conditional pursuance of taxing rights 
on behalf the Source State. This feature turns Article 10 OECD an “open distributive 
rule”48, read in conjunction to the other provisions of this article and Articles 23a and B 
of the Model.  
The subjective scope of the Model comprises dividends paid by a company resident in 
one Contracting State to resident of another Contracting State (Article 10 paragraph 1). 
Thereof, two features are critical to understand in essence the provision. On the one 
hand, the concept of “dividends” and, on the other, the rule on the efficient allocation 
of tax power between the aforementioned States, introduced in paragraph 2.However, 
for the designation of the material scope of the Model, the general rule of Article 10 
(1) OECD which reminds us that the State of the parent company holds full taxing right 
on dividends paid by a resident company to company of another Contracting State. 
This provision indicates the essential characteristics for the application of the Model 
and the subsequent taxation in the hands of the parent company, i.e. payment of 
dividends of a cross-border flow. For the distribution of the roles between the 
Contracting Parties, the Model provides for general provisions under Articles 3 and 4 
dealing with the definition of “company” and “resident”, notions that are been finally 
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left to the law of the State applying the Convention49. Moreover, the concept of 
“dividends” shall be examined closely not only in the light of the Model but also in 
comparison to similar terms, such as “distribution of profits”, in the context of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 
3.3. A comparative approach of “dividends” 
 
In its third paragraph, the Model formulates a definition of the term “dividends” for 
treaty use, exemplifying types of corporate rights whose outcome may be handled and 
taxed as income from dividends. The power of an autonomous definition according to 
the Model is, though, circumvented by a reference clause to the domestic law of the 
State of the subsidiary. Thus, the decisive power of the autonomous definition shall be 
protected by recourse to a strict interpretation of the clause, which shall be taken as 
referring to the domestic law of the Source State only as regards “other corporate 
rights”50 in the last part of the provision. In this framework, it is for the State applying 
the Double Tax Convention to define who is the beneficiary, i.e. who receives 
dividends, according to its national law. In the same manner, the term “paid” shall be 
interpreted broadly, so as to capture any type of distributing funds to shareholders, as 
indicated by the OECD Commentary of Article 10. Consequently, both distributions by 
or to residents of third, non-contracting States and distributions attributable to a 
permanent establishment are outside the scope of the provision. 
What runs primarily of the provision is the construction of the capital of the 
distributing company in shares and the type of the participation of the receiving 
company in the profits, by exclusion of debt-claims treated by Article 11 OECD. The 
expression “other corporate rights” stands in favor of corporate associations with legal 
personality, leaving outside the scope the form of partnership51, although it would be 
more systematically accurate to be taken into account as including “any entity that is 
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treated as body corporate for tax purposes”[Article 3(1) (d)]. It is deduced hereof that 
risk taking on behalf of the receiving party was meant to be the distinctive factor 
between income from dividends and income from other sources, associated with the 
capacity of a shareholder, albeit not expressly defined. A more liberal approach focuses 
on the absence of a reference to the shareholder relationship in any paragraph of the 
Article52, although this element is implied in paragraph 2. Moreover, as taxing of 
income in case of thin capitalization is argued to fall within the scope of the Article, 
after its re-characterization by the relevant authorities by reference to the criterion of 
exposure to the risk of the debtor, it could be similarly supported for other situations 
peculiar to a shareholder lien, such as usufruct  arrangement. 
On its turn, in the Parent – Subsidiary Directive the term “dividend” is replaced by the 
“distribution of profits”, also autonomously interpreted. In the foregoing articles the 
applier of the Directive comes before a clear legislative choice of a holding relationship, 
as found in Article 3 (1) (a) and (b), albeit it makes it more difficult to extent the scope 
so as to cover cases such as re-characterization of income from interest in thin 
capitalization. Indeed, the definition given to the term shall be coordinated with the 
other elements of the Directive, as the list of the company forms and the list of taxes 
that it includes, but it may also be resilient to achieve the goal of harmonization. 
3.4. Rules on the allocation of taxing rights 
As mentioned above, Article 10(1) prescribes a general rule on taxation of dividends in 
the State of the parent company read in conjunction to paragraph (2), in which the 
verb “may” indicates the non-exhaustive character of the taxation in the state of 
residence. For the conciliation and the consequences of this double tax powers 
conferment, attention shall be paid to Articles 23A and B, according to the measure 
that each State has chosen to relieve double taxation. 
For the limitation of the Source State’s taxing power, Article 10 (2) also sets a maximum 
tax rate of 5% on the gross amount of dividends, in cases of intercompany dividends 
under the condition that the beneficial owner participates to the share capital of the 
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distributing company with at least 25%, and a maximum tax rate of 15% “in all other 
cases”, i.e. if either they do not reach the participation threshold or the beneficial 
owner is a partnership that is expressly excepted by subparagraph (a). Nevertheless, it 
is for the Contracting States to agree on lower tax rates or to the exclusive taxation in 
the State of the parent company53. 
Additionally, emphasis shall be given to the handling of permanent establishments 
under the Model. Paragraph (4) removes from the scope of the tax allocation rules of 
paragraphs (1) and (2)beneficiaries receiving dividends stemming from a holding 
“effectively connected” with a permanent establishment of the receiving company in 
the Source State. This rule results to the dividends being taxed in the territory of the 
Source State as business profits of the permanent establishment according the rules of 
Article 7 of the Model, and not according to Article 1054. For the avoidance of tax abuse 
by transferring shares to permanent establishments in countries with preferential tax 
regime, the Model the effective connection is affirmed when dividends are attributed 
to the permanent establishment following the criteria of attribution as imprinted in the 
report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (OECD 2010, Paris)55, 
based on the ascertainment of actual business activity and the exposure of the 
shareholder to the economic risks of such activity. 
3.5. Exemption and credit measures under Articles 23A and 23 B of the OECD Model 
Convention 
Regarding procedural rules, the power is left on the authorities of the Contracting 
States, while they may apply their domestic procedural rules. The conduct of the State 
of residence of the beneficiary against taxing by the other State is determined by 
measures delivered via Articles 23A and 23B, which are common to the Parent – 
Subsidiary Directive. 
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For the rate limitation to be reached and the subsequent elimination of double 
taxation, the State of the parent company shall choose between the most suitable 
measures to its fiscal environment, as in case of juridical double taxation the Model 
does not attach exclusive taxing powers to the State of source (“may be taxed”). The 
former State is offered for two methods: the exemption method under Article 23A and 
the credit method under Article 23B. 
Specifically, according to the exemption method, the State of the parent company shall 
abstain from the taxation of the dividends. Moreover, the Model opts for the 
exemption with progression method which enables the State to take it the amount of 
the dividends into consideration for the calculation of the remaining tax obligation of 
the receiving company. Nevertheless, during the negotiation of the Double Tax 
Convention, the Contracting States may adopt the system of full exemption, which 
obliges the State of the parent company not to calculate this amount at all. 
On the other hand, applying the credit method the State of the parent company 
includes the dividends as income in the shareholder’s tax obligation *Article 23 B (2)+, 
but in the end it grants a deduction from its own tax. In the scheme of the Model, the 
Contracting States are provided with the option of the ordinary credit method, which 
stands for a deduction up to the amount of the tax liability in that State [Article 23 B 
(1)]. 
After this brief presentation of the available methods, it has to be noted that the 
distinctive characteristic between them is found in their application, as the first refers 
to income (”exempt such income or capital from tax”)56and the second to the tax 
obligation (“a deduction from the tax … an amount equal to the income tax paid)57.
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4. Taxation of dividends in the Greek Tax Regime 
 
The Greek tax regime was first construed according to the Income Tax Code N. 
2238/1994, which got recently reformed by the law n. 4172/2013 (new Income Tax 
Code).  
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive was implemented in the Greek legal order by virtue of 
art. 8-11 of the law n.2578/1998 and the adjustment to the rules of the Directive was 
gradually achieved with the equation of the tax rates for domestic and foreign 
companies. In this point, it should be noted that the Hellenic Republic had opted for 
the maintenance of the withholding tax on dividends, as stated in the preamble of the 
Council Directive 90/435/EEC, until its implementation after eight years. A typical case 
showing the particularities of the fiscal policy of Greece is Athinaiki Zithopiia case58; as 
regards the disputed tax regime constituted by Articles 99 (1) and 106 of the (former) 
Income Tax Code, according to which distributed profits were taken from the taxable 
profits after adding to them the fraction of non-taxable or profits subject to special 
taxation entailing extinction of tax liability included in their gross income. This 
provision was activated only in case of distribution of profits, not of retained earnings. 
In this way, in order to determine the amount of dividends out of its taxable profits, 
non-taxable income and income of special taxation were reincorporated in the basis of 
assessment59, while the companies concerned did not have the chance to offset the 
increase with negative income from previous tax years. Τhe Court confirmed in its 
answer to the preliminary question the contrast of the provision of Article 106 (2) and 
(3) of the law n.2238/1994 to Article 5 (1) of the Parent Subsidiary Directive.   
Article 36(1) the new Code provides for the definition of the term “dividends” for the 
application of the relevant provisions. Specifically, it adds to the concept of “dividends”, 
as provided under the former Greek Income Code (law n. 2238/1994), income deriving 
both from participation in capital companies and partnerships irrespective of the legal 
form of the participating companies, and any related distributed amount60, according 
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to Art. 10 of OECD Model Convention so as to be aligned to the existing Double Tax 
Conventions signed between the Hellenic Republic and other States61. 
Furthermore, the provision makes a distinction between taxation of dividends in the 
hands of natural persons and in the hands of legal persons. In the second paragraph  it 
dictates that the tax obligation of natural persons runs out with the imposition of 
withholding tax on it (Art. 61, 62 paragraph 1a and 64 paragraph 3 of the Income Tax 
Code), as well as for legal persons who are not tax residents and do not have their 
permanent establishment in the State. However, for those subject to corporate income 
taxation, withholding tax is deducted from the total tax due (art. 64 paragraph 4). The 
accordance with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is expressed through Article 63 
paragraph (1) of the Code, also applying in domestic distributions62, repeating the 
conditions set in the Directive and adopting the requirement of a minimum holding 
period of 24 months. Accordingly, Article 48 rules for the exemption of intercompany 
dividends received by Greek tax resident companies (or their permanent 
establishments) under conditions set by the Parent Subsidiary Directive and repeated 
in the body of the Income Tax Code. 
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Conclusions 
In the tax practice dividends may be taxed more than one times and in more than one 
States; in the hands of the distributing company they are subject to corporation tax as 
generated income, to withholding tax upon the distribution, and in the hands of the 
subsidiary to dividends tax. From this tax sequence emerges the phenomenon of 
economic and juridical double taxation, according to the special characteristics of each 
case (domestic or cross-border distribution etc.), a fact that usually poses obstacles to 
the expansion of a company’s activities63.  
On EU level, the endeavor to harmonize the direct taxation systems of the Member 
States has been based on its conduce to the completion of the internal market. This 
necessity was first recognized by the European Court of Justice (now CJEU) and the 
solutions were based to the fundamental freedoms of establishment and free 
movement of capital, without prejudice to the right of each Member State to rule 
predominantly in the field of taxation, in the absence of any harmonizing rules on EU 
level.  
The delay in contrast to indirect taxation was gradually covered (and the process is still 
on in the internal market) by a series of enlightening decisions on behalf of the Court 
urging the Member States to move on to the necessary transformations by measures 
of positive integration for the adoption of a minimum of common principles on the 
abolition of double taxation. The mere arrangement of double taxation issues in the 
cross-border distribution of intercompany dividends through the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive even though it addresses critical issues on this field, stumbles on its restricted 
scope of application. On international level, the interpretative value of the OECD 
Model Convention is undoubted, though it cannot provide for a satisfactory level of 
legal certainty and homogeneity. In this scheme, further legislative initiatives on EU 
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level are necessary for a more extensive harmonization of direct taxation in the 
internal market. 
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